

# Gender-biased Structural and Technological Changes (and *The Political Economy of*)

Izaskun Zuazu

*Institute für Socioökonomie (IfSO), Universität Duisburg-Essen &  
External researcher at International Labour Organization (ILO)*

**Gendering Macroeconomics**  
**Forum for Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies**  
**(FMM) Berlin 2025**

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkkaracan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkkaracan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkharacan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkkaracan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkharacan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkharacan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkharacan and Zuazu, 2025)



## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkkaracan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkkaracan and Zuazu, 2025)

## ① Structural change (SC)

- ▶ Employment transitions from agriculture to manufacturing and services, at the heart of a dynamic process of economic development (Ocampo, 2020)
- ▶ Canonical process primarily driven by men: women first transition out of agriculture and exit (paid) work, then re-enter labor force in (mostly) service sector (Braunstein and Zuazu, 2023; Chiplunkar and Kleineberg, 2025)

## ② Technological change (TC)

- ▶ Shifts of the frontier between tasks performed by humans and machines
- ▶ SC and TC complex processes (economic development, secularization, education attainment, urbanization, fertility) embedded in gender systems
- ▶ Gender-neutral analysis of SC and TC no longer the default: gender gaps not only a social issue but a macroeconomic one

## ③ Political consequences of SC and TC

- ▶ Liberal democracies challenged by job-displacing effects of technological and structural changes and rise of radical/far right (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022)
- ▶ Labor market outcomes affect political attitudes differently by gender (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022; Ilkkaracan and Zuazu, 2025)

# Outline

- 1 Structural change and gender sectoral segregation
  - Puzzle
  - Data and methods
  - Results
- 2 Robots and women in manufacturing
  - Puzzle
  - Data and methods
  - Results
- 3 Political consequences of SC and TC
  - Puzzle
  - Data and methods
  - Results
- 4 Conclusions and debate

# Structural change and gender sectoral segregation in sub-Saharan African countries

Zuazu (2024) *J. Int. Dev.*

- SC in SSA widely analyzed: premature deindustrialization and structural heterogeneity (McMillan et al. (2017); Tregenna (2015); Rodrik (2016))
- SC's labor market outcomes in SSA are far less understood (Mensah et al., 2023), let alone its gender effects
- SC linked to distribution of paid/unpaid work already by Kuznets, Lewis and Boserup, gendered aftermath of structural adjustment programs covered by feminist macroeconomists (Benería and Feldman, 1992; Elson, 1995)
- In this paper: SC's impact in gender sectoral segregation in SSA:
  - ① Comparative advantage arguments: productivity reduces physical requirements, leading to increasing the demand for women's work (Welch, 2000; Rendall, 2013; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014)
  - ② Feminist economics arguments: gender stereotypes, discrimination and competition for good jobs cluster women in low-productive sectors (Bergmann, 1981; Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejari and Kucera, 2021)

# Structural change and gender sectoral segregation in sub-Saharan African countries

Zuazu (2024) *J. Int. Dev.*

- SC in SSA widely analyzed: premature deindustrialization and structural heterogeneity (McMillan et al. (2017); Tregenna (2015); Rodrik (2016))
- SC's labor market outcomes in SSA are far less understood (Mensah et al., 2023), let alone its **gender** effects
- SC linked to distribution of paid/unpaid work already by Kuznets, Lewis and Boserup, gendered aftermath of structural adjustment programs covered by feminist macroeconomists (Benería and Feldman, 1992; Elson, 1995)
- In this paper: SC's impact in gender sectoral segregation in SSA:
  - ① Comparative advantage arguments: productivity reduces physical requirements, leading to increasing the demand for women's work (Walch, 2000; Rendall, 2013; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014)
  - ② Feminist economics arguments: gender stereotypes, discrimination and competition for good jobs cluster women in low-productive sectors (Bergmann, 1981; Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejari and Kucera, 2021)

# Structural change and gender sectoral segregation in sub-Saharan African countries

Zuazu (2024) *J. Int. Dev.*

- SC in SSA widely analyzed: premature deindustrialization and structural heterogeneity (McMillan et al. (2017); Tregenna (2015); Rodrik (2016))
- SC's labor market outcomes in SSA are far less understood (Mensah et al., 2023), let alone its **gender** effects
- SC linked to distribution of paid/unpaid work already by Kuznets, Lewis and Boserup, gendered aftermath of structural adjustment programs covered by feminist macroeconomists (Benería and Feldman, 1992; Elson, 1995)
- In this paper: SC's impact in gender sectoral segregation in SSA:
  - ① Comparative advantage arguments: productivity reduces physical requirements, leading to increasing the demand for women's work (Walch, 2000; Randall, 2013; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014)
  - ② Feminist economics arguments: gender stereotypes, discrimination and competition for good jobs cluster women in low-productive sectors (Bergmann, 1981; Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejari and Kucera, 2021)

# Structural change and gender sectoral segregation in sub-Saharan African countries

Zuazu (2024) *J. Int. Dev.*

- SC in SSA widely analyzed: premature deindustrialization and structural heterogeneity (McMillan et al. (2017); Tregenna (2015); Rodrik (2016))
- SC's labor market outcomes in SSA are far less understood (Mensah et al., 2023), let alone its **gender** effects
- SC linked to distribution of paid/unpaid work already by Kuznets, Lewis and Boserup, gendered aftermath of structural adjustment programs covered by feminist macroeconomists (Benería and Feldman, 1992; Elson, 1995)
- **In this paper:** SC's impact in gender sectoral segregation in SSA:
  - 1 **Comparative advantage arguments:** productivity reduces physical requirements, leading to increasing the demand for women's work (Welch, 2000; Rendall, 2013; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014)
  - 2 **Feminist economics arguments:** gender stereotypes, discrimination and competition for *good* jobs cluster women in low-productive sectors (Bergmann, 1981; Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)



# Structural change and gender sectoral segregation in sub-Saharan African countries

Zuazu (2024) *J. Int. Dev.*

- SC in SSA widely analyzed: premature deindustrialization and structural heterogeneity (McMillan et al. (2017); Tregenna (2015); Rodrik (2016))
- SC's labor market outcomes in SSA are far less understood (Mensah et al., 2023), let alone its **gender** effects
- SC linked to distribution of paid/unpaid work already by Kuznets, Lewis and Boserup, gendered aftermath of structural adjustment programs covered by feminist macroeconomists (Benería and Feldman, 1992; Elson, 1995)
- **In this paper:** SC's impact in gender sectoral segregation in SSA:
  - 1 **Comparative advantage arguments:** productivity reduces physical requirements, leading to increasing the demand for women's work (Welch, 2000; Rendall, 2013; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014)
  - 2 **Feminist economics arguments:** gender stereotypes, discrimination and competition for *good* jobs cluster women in low-productive sectors (Bergmann, 1981; Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Structural change and gender sectoral segregation in sub-Saharan African countries

Zuazu (2024) *J. Int. Dev.*

- SC in SSA widely analyzed: premature deindustrialization and structural heterogeneity (McMillan et al. (2017); Tregenna (2015); Rodrik (2016))
- SC's labor market outcomes in SSA are far less understood (Mensah et al., 2023), let alone its **gender** effects
- SC linked to distribution of paid/unpaid work already by Kuznets, Lewis and Boserup, gendered aftermath of structural adjustment programs covered by feminist macroeconomists (Benería and Feldman, 1992; Elson, 1995)
- **In this paper:** SC's impact in gender sectoral segregation in SSA:
  - ➊ **Comparative advantage arguments:** productivity reduces physical requirements, leading to increasing the demand for women's work (Welch, 2000; Rendall, 2013; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014)
  - ➋ **Feminist economics arguments:** gender stereotypes, discrimination and competition for *good* jobs cluster women in low-productive sectors (Bergmann, 1981; Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Data and methods

- Data on 10 industries in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia during 1960 to 2010 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)'s Africa Sector Database (ASD) (de Vries et al., 2015))
- Formal and informal employment (Juhn et al., 2013, 2014; Arora et al., 2023)
- Gender sectoral segregation relatively low in SSA, while FLFP persistently low (Borrowman and Klasen, 2020)
- Non-linear association between aggregate labor productivity and gender segregation?
- IV panel data model (FLFP instrumented using household composition (Agarwal, 1997; Spierings, 2014; Dhanaraj and Mahambare, 2019) )

$$\log(ID_{ct}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LP_{c,t-s} + \beta_2 LP_{c,t-s}^2 + X'_{c,t-s}\beta + v_{ict} \quad (1)$$

- Outcome variable: Dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955)

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{F_i}{F} - \frac{M_i}{M} \right| * 100 \quad (2)$$

# Data and methods

- Data on 10 industries in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia during 1960 to 2010 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)'s Africa Sector Database (ASD) (de Vries et al., 2015))
- Formal and informal employment (Juhn et al., 2013, 2014; Arora et al., 2023)
- Gender sectoral segregation relatively low in SSA, while FLFP persistently low (Borrowman and Klasen, 2020)
- Non-linear association between aggregate labor productivity and gender segregation?
- IV panel data model (FLFP instrumented using household composition (Agarwal, 1997; Spierings, 2014; Dhanaraj and Mahambare, 2019) )

$$\log(ID_{ct}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LP_{c,t-s} + \beta_2 LP_{c,t-s}^2 + X'_{c,t-s}\beta + v_{ict} \quad (1)$$

- Outcome variable: Dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955)

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{F_i}{F} - \frac{M_i}{M} \right| * 100 \quad (2)$$

# Data and methods

- Data on 10 industries in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia during 1960 to 2010 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)'s Africa Sector Database (ASD) (de Vries et al., 2015))
- Formal and informal employment (Juhn et al., 2013, 2014; Arora et al., 2023)
- Gender sectoral segregation relatively low in SSA, while FLFP persistently low (Borrowman and Klasen, 2020)
- Non-linear association between aggregate labor productivity and gender segregation?
- IV panel data model (FLFP instrumented using household composition (Agarwal, 1997; Spierings, 2014; Dhanaraj and Mahambare, 2019) )

$$\log(ID_{ct}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LP_{c,t-s} + \beta_2 LP_{c,t-s}^2 + X'_{c,t-s}\beta + v_{ict} \quad (1)$$

- Outcome variable: Dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955)

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{F_i}{F} - \frac{M_i}{M} \right| * 100 \quad (2)$$

# Data and methods

- Data on 10 industries in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia during 1960 to 2010 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)'s Africa Sector Database (ASD) (de Vries et al., 2015))
- Formal and informal employment (Juhn et al., 2013, 2014; Arora et al., 2023)
- Gender sectoral segregation relatively low in SSA, while FLFP persistently low (Borrowman and Klasen, 2020)
- Non-linear association between aggregate labor productivity and gender segregation?
- IV panel data model (FLFP instrumented using household composition (Agarwal, 1997; Spierings, 2014; Dhanaraj and Mahambare, 2019) )

$$\log(ID_{ct}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LP_{c,t-s} + \beta_2 LP_{c,t-s}^2 + X'_{c,t-s}\beta + v_{ict} \quad (1)$$

- Outcome variable: Dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955)

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{F_i}{F} - \frac{M_i}{M} \right| * 100 \quad (2)$$

# Data and methods

- Data on 10 industries in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia during 1960 to 2010 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)'s Africa Sector Database (ASD) (de Vries et al., 2015))
- Formal and informal employment (Juhn et al., 2013, 2014; Arora et al., 2023)
- Gender sectoral segregation relatively low in SSA, while FLFP persistently low (Borrowman and Klasen, 2020)
- Non-linear association between aggregate labor productivity and gender segregation?
- IV panel data model (FLFP instrumented using household composition (Agarwal, 1997; Spierings, 2014; Dhanaraj and Mahambare, 2019) )

$$\log(ID_{ct}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LP_{c,t-s} + \beta_2 LP_{c,t-s}^2 + X'_{c,t-s}\beta + v_{ict} \quad (1)$$

- Outcome variable: Dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955)

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{F_i}{F} - \frac{M_i}{M} \right| * 100 \quad (2)$$

# Data and methods


- Data on 10 industries in Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia during 1960 to 2010 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)'s Africa Sector Database (ASD) (de Vries et al., 2015))
- Formal and informal employment (Juhn et al., 2013, 2014; Arora et al., 2023)
- Gender sectoral segregation relatively low in SSA, while FLFP persistently low (Borrowman and Klasen, 2020)
- Non-linear association between aggregate labor productivity and gender segregation?
- IV panel data model (FLFP instrumented using household composition (Agarwal, 1997; Spierings, 2014; Dhanaraj and Mahambare, 2019) )

$$\log(ID_{ct}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LP_{c,t-s} + \beta_2 LP_{c,t-s}^2 + X'_{c,t-s}\beta + v_{ict} \quad (1)$$


- Outcome variable: Dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955)

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{F_i}{F} - \frac{M_i}{M} \right| * 100 \quad (2)$$






**Figure:** Gender Distribution of Sectoral Employment and Relative Labor Productivity (Sample avg. 1960-2010)



**Figure:** Aggregate Labor Productivity and Dissimilarity Index

# Results



**Figure:** Estimated Marginal Effects of Aggregate Labor Productivity in Gender Sectoral Segregation

# Takeaway I

- Significant role of SC (proxied by aggregate labor productivity gains) in gender sectoral segregation in SSA, using IV and higher industry-level data disaggregation, supplementing previous knowledge Borrowman and Klasen (2020)
- Gender-sensitive variables and empirical analysis (e.g. household composition and size) to disentangle the reproduction and production sides of structural change, as suggested by Elson (2025)
- **Non-linearities:** initial increases of productivity lead to more equal distribution of sectoral employment, but further productivity gains might unleash gender competition for specific sectors
- SC as a *dynamic process* (Ocampo, 2020; Ciarli et al., 2021; Savona and Vertova, 2025) : *à la* Pasinetti on that economic development not a static but rather a *dynamic* process driven by continuous structural changes such as composition of output, factor endowments, and **technological progress**.

# Takeaway I

- Significant role of SC (proxied by aggregate labor productivity gains) in gender sectoral segregation in SSA, using IV and higher industry-level data disaggregation, supplementing previous knowledge Borrowman and Klasen (2020)
- Gender-sensitive variables and empirical analysis (e.g. household composition and size) to disentangle the reproduction and production sides of structural change, as suggested by Elson (2025)
- **Non-linearities:** initial increases of productivity lead to more equal distribution of sectoral employment, but further productivity gains might unleash gender competition for specific sectors
- SC as a *dynamic process* (Ocampo, 2020; Ciarli et al., 2021; Savona and Vertova, 2025) : *à la* Pasinetti on that economic development not a static but rather a *dynamic* process driven by continuous structural changes such as composition of output, factor endowments, and **technological progress**.

# Takeaway I

- Significant role of SC (proxied by aggregate labor productivity gains) in gender sectoral segregation in SSA, using IV and higher industry-level data disaggregation, supplementing previous knowledge Borrowman and Klasen (2020)
- Gender-sensitive variables and empirical analysis (e.g. household composition and size) to disentangle the reproduction and production sides of structural change, as suggested by Elson (2025)
- **Non-linearities:** initial increases of productivity lead to more equal distribution of sectoral employment, but further productivity gains might unleash gender competition for specific sectors
- SC as a *dynamic process* (Ocampo, 2020; Ciarli et al., 2021; Savona and Vertova, 2025) : *à la* Pasinetti on that economic development not a static but rather a *dynamic* process driven by continuous structural changes such as composition of output, factor endowments, and **technological progress**.

# Takeaway I

- Significant role of SC (proxied by aggregate labor productivity gains) in gender sectoral segregation in SSA, using IV and higher industry-level data disaggregation, supplementing previous knowledge Borrowman and Klasen (2020)
- Gender-sensitive variables and empirical analysis (e.g. household composition and size) to disentangle the reproduction and production sides of structural change, as suggested by Elson (2025)
- **Non-linearities:** initial increases of productivity lead to more equal distribution of sectoral employment, but further productivity gains might unleash gender competition for specific sectors
- SC as a *dynamic process* (Ocampo, 2020; Ciarli et al., 2021; Savona and Vertova, 2025) : *à la* Pasinetti on that economic development not a static but rather a *dynamic* process driven by continuous structural changes such as composition of output, factor endowments, and **technological progress**.

# Robots and Women in Manufacturing

Zuazu (2026) forthcoming *Fem. Econ.*

- Two thirds of Europeans believe that robots and AI will destroy more jobs than create new jobs (European Commission, 2024)
- Gender consequences of robotization remain underexplored and evidence is inconclusive (Aksoy et al., 2021; Filippi et al., 2023), generally focus on aggregate levels, case studies and/or gender wage gap (Ge and Zhou, 2020; Deng et al., 2023)
- **In this paper:** whether and how industrial robots associate with share of women in manufacturing industries
  - **Employment effects of robotization:** job-displacing effects of industrial robots —> automation vs augmentation (Dauth et al., 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, 2022)
  - **De-feminization of the manufacturing:** technological upgrading and labor productivity gains associated with reducing impact of women in industrial jobs (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)
  - **Do FLFP levels matter?** positive effect of robots and AI for women (Aksoy et al. (2021); Filippi et al. (2023); Albanesi et al. (2025) but more de-feminization of industrial jobs at higher FLFP (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)



# Robots and Women in Manufacturing

Zuazu (2026) forthcoming *Fem. Econ.*

- Two thirds of Europeans believe that robots and AI will destroy more jobs than create new jobs (European Commission, 2024)
- Gender consequences of robotization remain underexplored and evidence is inconclusive (Aksoy et al., 2021; Filippi et al., 2023), generally focus on aggregate levels, case studies and/or gender wage gap (Ge and Zhou, 2020; Deng et al., 2023)
- In this paper: whether and how industrial robots associate with share of women in manufacturing industries

- ① Employment effects of robotization: job-displacing effects of industrial robots — > automation vs augmentation (Dauth et al., 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, 2022)
- ② De-feminization of the manufacturing: technological upgrading and labor productivity gains associated with reducing impact of women in industrial jobs (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)
- ③ Do FLFP levels matter? positive effect of robots and AI for women (Aksoy et al. (2021); Filippi et al. (2023); Albanesi et al. (2025) but more de-feminization of industrial jobs at higher FLFP (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Robots and Women in Manufacturing

Zuazu (2026) forthcoming *Fem. Econ.*

- Two thirds of Europeans believe that robots and AI will destroy more jobs than create new jobs (European Commission, 2024)
- Gender consequences of robotization remain underexplored and evidence is inconclusive (Aksoy et al., 2021; Filippi et al., 2023), generally focus on aggregate levels, case studies and/or gender wage gap (Ge and Zhou, 2020; Deng et al., 2023)
- **In this paper:** whether and how industrial robots associate with share of women in manufacturing industries

- ① **Employment effects of robotization:** job-displacing effects of industrial robots — > automation vs augmentation (Dauth et al., 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, 2022)
- ② **De-feminization of the manufacturing:** technological upgrading and labor productivity gains associated with reducing impact of women in industrial jobs (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)
- ③ **Do FLFP levels matter?** positive effect of robots and AI for women (Aksoy et al. (2021); Filippi et al. (2023); Albanesi et al. (2025) but more de-feminization of industrial jobs at higher FLFP (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Robots and Women in Manufacturing

Zuazu (2026) forthcoming *Fem. Econ.*

- Two thirds of Europeans believe that robots and AI will destroy more jobs than create new jobs (European Commission, 2024)
- Gender consequences of robotization remain underexplored and evidence is inconclusive (Aksoy et al., 2021; Filippi et al., 2023), generally focus on aggregate levels, case studies and/or gender wage gap (Ge and Zhou, 2020; Deng et al., 2023)
- **In this paper:** whether and how industrial robots associate with share of women in manufacturing industries

- ① **Employment effects of robotization:** job-displacing effects of industrial robots — > automation vs augmentation (Dauth et al., 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, 2022)
- ② **De-feminization of the manufacturing:** technological upgrading and labor productivity gains associated with reducing impact of women in industrial jobs (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)
- ③ **Do FLFP levels matter?** positive effect of robots and AI for women (Aksoy et al. (2021); Filippi et al. (2023); Albanesi et al. (2025) but more de-feminization of industrial jobs at higher FLFP (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Robots and Women in Manufacturing

Zuazu (2026) forthcoming *Fem. Econ.*

- Two thirds of Europeans believe that robots and AI will destroy more jobs than create new jobs (European Commission, 2024)
- Gender consequences of robotization remain underexplored and evidence is inconclusive (Aksoy et al., 2021; Filippi et al., 2023), generally focus on aggregate levels, case studies and/or gender wage gap (Ge and Zhou, 2020; Deng et al., 2023)
- **In this paper:** whether and how industrial robots associate with share of women in manufacturing industries
  - 1 **Employment effects of robotization:** job-displacing effects of industrial robots — > automation vs augmentation (Dauth et al., 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, 2022)
  - 2 **De-feminization of the manufacturing:** technological upgrading and labor productivity gains associated with reducing impact of women in industrial jobs (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)
  - 3 **Do FLFP levels matter?** positive effect of robots and AI for women (Aksoy et al. (2021); Filippi et al. (2023); Albanesi et al. (2025) but more de-feminization of industrial jobs at higher FLFP (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Robots and Women in Manufacturing

Zuazu (2026) forthcoming *Fem. Econ.*

- Two thirds of Europeans believe that robots and AI will destroy more jobs than create new jobs (European Commission, 2024)
- Gender consequences of robotization remain underexplored and evidence is inconclusive (Aksoy et al., 2021; Filippi et al., 2023), generally focus on aggregate levels, case studies and/or gender wage gap (Ge and Zhou, 2020; Deng et al., 2023)
- **In this paper:** whether and how industrial robots associate with share of women in manufacturing industries
  - ➊ **Employment effects of robotization:** job-displacing effects of industrial robots — > automation vs augmentation (Dauth et al., 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, 2022)
  - ➋ **De-feminization of the manufacturing:** technological upgrading and labor productivity gains associated with reducing impact of women in industrial jobs (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)
  - ➌ **Do FLFP levels matter?** positive effect of robots and AI for women Aksoy et al. (2021); Filippi et al. (2023); Albanesi et al. (2025) but more de-feminization of industrial jobs at higher FLFP (Seguino and Braunstein, 2019; Tejani and Kucera, 2021)

# Data and method

- Panel dataset of 11 manufacturing industries, 14 countries during 1993-2015  
UNIDO INDSTAT, International Federation of Robotics (IFR), COMTRADE, World Bank, ILO, Women in Business and the Law (WBL) – Eurostat RAMON correspondence
- Sample of countries Bulgaria, Croatia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Türkiye and Vietnam
- Interactive dynamic panel data model, endogenous robotization and FLFP

$$\begin{aligned} y_{ict} = & \beta_0 + \alpha y_{ic,t-1} + \beta_1 R_{ic,t-1} + \beta_2 FLFP_{c,t-1} + \\ & + \beta_3 R * FLFP_{ic,t-1} + X'_{ic,t-1} + Z'_{c,t-1} \beta + v_{ict} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

$i = \text{industry}; c = \text{country}; t = \text{year};$

- Bartik-shock type measure of Robotization (Bartik, 1991; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020; Bellemare and Wichman, 2020; Aksoy et al., 2021)

$$R_{ict} = IHS \left[ \frac{Robots_{ict}}{Employees_{ic,1980}/10,000} - \frac{Robots_{ic,t-1}}{Employees_{ic,1980}/10,000} \right] \quad (4)$$

# Descriptives I





Figure: Robots per 10k Employees and Female Share of Manufacturing Industries

# Descriptives II




**Figure:** Long-differences Correlation between Changes in Robots per 10k Employees and Female Shares



Table 2: Robotization and FLFP in Female Shares in Manufacturing Industries

Dependent variable: Industry female share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	FE	$\Delta$ -GMM	$\Delta$ -GMM	$\Delta$ -GMM	$\Delta$ -GMM
Sample	All	All	All	No Japan	All
Female share $_{t-1}$	0.734*** (0.066)	0.340** (0.165)	0.382** (0.143)	0.371** (0.148)	0.303** (0.141)
Robotization	2.374*** (0.662)	4.251** (1.996)	3.116** (1.295)	4.295** (2.042)	4.397** (1.856)
FLFP	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002*** 0.001
Robotization * FLFP	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.063** (0.030)	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.067* (0.036)	-0.062** (0.028)
Elasticity of Robotization coefficient	0.028	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.006
Elasticity of Interaction coefficient	-0.0004	-0.0007	-0.0005	-0.0007	-0.0007
No. of Observations	1030	850	850	724	850
No. of Groups	90	90	90	81	90
Within R-squared	0.531				
Robotization treated as		Exogenous	Endogenous	Endogenous	Endogenous
FLFP treated as		Exogenous	Exogenous	Exogenous	Endogenous
AR(1)		0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001
AR(2)		0.496	0.486	0.449	0.638
Diff-hansen		0.119	0.688	0.208	0.987
No. of Instruments		24	58	58	58

# Results



**Figure:** Interaction between Robotization and FLFP in Female Shares in Manufacturing Industries

# Takeaways II

- Robotization seems to affect positively the share of women in manufacturing countries in the sample of countries considered
- Using levels of female employment and male employment, results suggest that robotization affects particularly women
- These results align and expand those of Deng et al. (2023) in finding that robots might increase female employment shares in manufacturing
- Context matters: the impact of robotization might depend on the attachment of women to the (paid) workforce
- Other relevant factors in the paper: country income levels and sectoral productivity levels

# Takeaways II

- Robotization seems to affect positively the share of women in manufacturing countries in the sample of countries considered
- Using levels of female employment and male employment, results suggest that robotization affects particularly women
- These results align and expand those of Deng et al. (2023) in finding that robots might increase female employment shares in manufacturing
- Context matters: the impact of robotization might depend on the attachment of women to the (paid) workforce
- Other relevant factors in the paper: country income levels and sectoral productivity levels

# Takeaways II

- Robotization seems to affect positively the share of women in manufacturing countries in the sample of countries considered
- Using levels of female employment and male employment, results suggest that robotization affects particularly women
- These results align and expand those of Deng et al. (2023) in finding that robots might increase female employment shares in manufacturing
- Context matters: the impact of robotization might depend on the attachment of women to the (paid) workforce
- Other relevant factors in the paper: country income levels and sectoral productivity levels

# Takeaways II

- Robotization seems to affect positively the share of women in manufacturing countries in the sample of countries considered
- Using levels of female employment and male employment, results suggest that robotization affects particularly women
- These results align and expand those of Deng et al. (2023) in finding that robots might increase female employment shares in manufacturing
- Context matters: the impact of robotization might depend on the attachment of women to the (paid) workforce
- Other relevant factors in the paper: country income levels and sectoral productivity levels

# Takeaways II

- Robotization seems to affect positively the share of women in manufacturing countries in the sample of countries considered
- Using levels of female employment and male employment, results suggest that robotization affects particularly women
- These results align and expand those of Deng et al. (2023) in finding that robots might increase female employment shares in manufacturing
- Context matters: the impact of robotization might depend on the attachment of women to the (paid) workforce
- Other relevant factors in the paper: country income levels and sectoral productivity levels

# How Gender Intersects with Paid and Unpaid Work Status in Political Ideology: Evidence from Homemakers in Spain

Ilkkaracan and Zuazu (2025) *Fem. Econ*

- Job-displacing effects of technological change and structural change can affect political attitudes (Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022), gender differential impacts understudied (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022)
- Gender gaps in political ideology (Likert-type 1-10 scale) transformed from traditional (women more right-wing than) to modern gaps (women more left-wing) in most Western countries since 1980 (Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 2003; Shorrocks, 2018)
- Evidence for Italy and Türkiye show that right-wing/populist right political attitudes of women depend on their labor market attachment (Barisione, 2014; Ilkkaracan, 2019)
- In this paper: monthly survey individual data for Spain (1993-2019), we show that Spain adopted a modern gap model as of 2018, driven by women in the paid workforce
- Method: IV probit models using the probability of being left-wing as dependent variable



# How Gender Intersects with Paid and Unpaid Work Status in Political Ideology: Evidence from Homemakers in Spain

Ilkkaracan and Zuazu (2025) *Fem. Econ*

- Job-displacing effects of technological change and structural change can affect political attitudes (Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022), gender differential impacts understudied (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022)
- Gender gaps in political ideology (Likert-type 1-10 scale) transformed from traditional (women more right-wing than) to modern gaps (women more left-wing) in most Western countries since 1980 (Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 2003; Shorrocks, 2018)
- Evidence for Italy and Türkiye show that right-wing/populist right political attitudes of women depend on their labor market attachment (Barisione, 2014; Ilkkaracan, 2019)
- In this paper: monthly survey individual data for Spain (1993-2019), we show that Spain adopted a modern gap model as of 2018, driven by women in the paid workforce
- Method: IV probit models using the probability of being left-wing as dependent variable

# How Gender Intersects with Paid and Unpaid Work Status in Political Ideology: Evidence from Homemakers in Spain

Ilkkaracan and Zuazu (2025) *Fem. Econ*

- Job-displacing effects of technological change and structural change can affect political attitudes (Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022), gender differential impacts understudied (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022)
- Gender gaps in political ideology (Likert-type 1-10 scale) transformed from traditional (women more right-wing than) to modern gaps (women more left-wing) in most Western countries since 1980 (Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 2003; Shorrocks, 2018)
- Evidence for Italy and Türkiye show that right-wing/populist right political attitudes of women depend on their labor market attachment (Barisione, 2014; Ilkkaracan, 2019)
- In this paper: monthly survey individual data for Spain (1993-2019), we show that Spain adopted a modern gap model as of 2018, driven by women in the paid workforce
- Method: IV probit models using the probability of being left-wing as dependent variable

# How Gender Intersects with Paid and Unpaid Work Status in Political Ideology: Evidence from Homemakers in Spain

Ilkkaracan and Zuazu (2025) *Fem. Econ*

- Job-displacing effects of technological change and structural change can affect political attitudes (Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022), gender differential impacts understudied (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022)
- Gender gaps in political ideology (Likert-type 1-10 scale) transformed from traditional (women more right-wing than) to modern gaps (women more left-wing) in most Western countries since 1980 (Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 2003; Shorrocks, 2018)
- Evidence for Italy and Türkiye show that right-wing/populist right political attitudes of women depend on their labor market attachment (Barisione, 2014; Ilkkaracan, 2019)
- **In this paper:** monthly survey individual data for Spain (1993-2019), we show that Spain adopted a modern gap model as of 2018, driven by women in the paid workforce
- Method: IV probit models using the probability of being left-wing as dependent variable

# How Gender Intersects with Paid and Unpaid Work Status in Political Ideology: Evidence from Homemakers in Spain

Ilkkaracan and Zuazu (2025) *Fem. Econ*

- Job-displacing effects of technological change and structural change can affect political attitudes (Kurer, 2020; Gallego and Kurer, 2022), gender differential impacts understudied (Gingrich and Kuo, 2022)
- Gender gaps in political ideology (Likert-type 1-10 scale) transformed from traditional (women more right-wing than) to modern gaps (women more left-wing) in most Western countries since 1980 (Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 2003; Shorrocks, 2018)
- Evidence for Italy and Türkiye show that right-wing/populist right political attitudes of women depend on their labor market attachment (Barisione, 2014; Ilkkaracan, 2019)
- [In this paper](#): monthly survey individual data for Spain (1993-2019), we show that Spain adopted a modern gap model as of 2018, driven by women in the paid workforce
- Method: IV probit models using the probability of being left-wing as dependent variable

# Descriptives I



Figure: Evolution of Political Ideology (1 leftist - 10 rightist) in Spain

# Results




Figure: Predicted Probabilities (IV Probit Models)

# Conclusions and final thoughts

- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research ► Polarization in EU28
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC

# Conclusions and final thoughts

- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research ► Polarization in EU28
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC



# Conclusions and final thoughts

- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research ► Polarization in EU28
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC

# Conclusions and final thoughts

- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research ► Polarization in EU28
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC

# Conclusions and final thoughts


- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research [► Polarization in EU28](#)
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC

# Conclusions and final thoughts

- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research ► Polarization in EU28
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC

# Conclusions and final thoughts

- Structural change and technological change: profound gender differences that can distort gender-equal, sustainable economic development
- Non-linearities, *dynamic* processes and contingencies: initial gains might get disrupted by increasing competition and new forms of discrimination
- Industrial policies should be accompanied by gender-aware assessments of
  - ① distribution of the job-displacing effects of SC and TC
  - ② gender composition of newly created jobs through technological augmentation
- SC and TC job-displacing effects can fuel gender political polarization, mechanisms that should be explored in future research [▶ Polarization in EU28](#)
- Beyond the gender binary as proposed by Badgett et al. (2019): feminist macroeconomics a perfect platform to analyze LGBTQ+ people's economic outcomes in the processes of SC and TC



**Figure:** Evolution of Political Ideology by Gender, EU28. Own elaboration. Data Source: Harmonized Euro barometer, GESIS.

# Descriptives II

► Back to Paper III




Figure: Evolution of Political Ideology by Labor Market Status in Spain

- Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. (2020). Robots and jobs: Evidence from us labor markets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(6):2188–2244.
- Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. (2022). Demographics and automation. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 89(1):1–44.
- Agarwal, B. (1997). 'bargaining' and gender relations: Within and beyond the household. *Feminist economics*, 3(1):1–51.
- Aksoy, C. G., Özcan, B., and Philipp, J. (2021). Robots and the gender pay gap in europe. *European Economic Review*, 134:103693.
- Albanesi, S., Dias da Silva, A., Jimeno, J. F., Lamo, A., and Wabitsch, A. (2025). New technologies and jobs in europe. *Economic Policy*, 40(121):71–139.
- Anelli, M., Giuntella, O., and Stella, L. (2019). Robots, labor markets, and family behavior.
- Arora, D., Braunstein, E., and Seguino, S. (2023). A macro analysis of gender segregation and job quality in latin america. *World Development*, 164:106153.



- Badgett, M. L., Waaldijk, K., and van der Meulen Rodgers, Y. (2019). The relationship between lgbt inclusion and economic development: Macro-level evidence. *World Development*, 120:1–14.
- Barisione, M. (2014). Debunking the myth of a “traditional” gender gap in the electoral support for silvio berlusconi in italy (1994–2013). *Electoral Studies*, 36:117–128.
- Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?
- Beaudry, P. and Lewis, E. (2014). Do male-female wage differentials reflect differences in the return to skill? cross-city evidence from 1980–2000. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 6(2):178–194.
- Bellemare, M. F. and Wichman, C. J. (2020). Elasticities and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 82(1):50–61.
- Benería, L. and Feldman, S. (1992). *Unequal burden: economic crises, persistent poverty, and women's work*. Westview Press Boulder, CO.

- Bergmann, B. R. (1981). The economic risks of being a housewife. *The American economic review*, 71(2):81–86.
- Borrowman, M. and Klasen, S. (2020). Drivers of gendered sectoral and occupational segregation in developing countries. *Feminist Economics*, 26(2):62–94.
- Boserup, E. (1970). Women's role in economic development george allen and urwin.
- Braunstein, E. and Zuazu, I. (2023). Gender structural change within manufacturing.
- Chiplunkar, G. and Kleineberg, T. (2025). *Gender barriers, structural transformation, and economic development*. World Bank.
- Ciarli, T., Savona, M., Thorpe, J., et al. (2021). Innovation for inclusive structural change. In *The challenges of technology and economic catch-up in emerging economies*, pages 349–376. Oxford University Press.
- Dauth, W., Findeisen, S., Südekum, J., and Woessner, N. (2017). German robots-the impact of industrial robots on workers.

- Deng, L., Müller, S., Plümpe, V., and Stegmaier, J. (2023). Robots and female employment in german manufacturing. In *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, volume 113, pages 224–228. American Economic Association 2014 Broadway, Suite 305, Nashville, TN 37203.
- Dhanaraj, S. and Mahambare, V. (2019). Family structure, education and women's employment in rural india. *World Development*, 115:17–29.
- Duncan, O. D. and Duncan, B. (1955). A methodological analysis of segregation indexes. *American sociological review*, 20(2):210–217.
- Elson, D. (1995). Gender awareness in modeling structural adjustment. *World Development*, 23(11):1851–1868.
- Elson, D. (2025). The diane elson reader: Gender, development and macroeconomic policy.
- Filippi, E., Bannò, M., and Trento, S. (2023). Automation technologies and the risk of substitution of women: Can gender equality in the institutional context reduce the risk? *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 191:122528.

- Gallego, A. and Kurer, T. (2022). Automation, digitalization, and artificial intelligence in the workplace: implications for political behavior. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 25:463–484.
- Ge, S. and Zhou, Y. (2020). Robots, computers, and the gender wage gap. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 178:194–222.
- Gingrich, J. and Kuo, A. (2022). Gender, technological risk, and political preferences. *Digitalization and the welfare state*, page 157.
- Ilkcaracan, I. (2019). Economic and political gender gaps and the rise of populism. *Journal of International Affairs*, 72(2):191–208.
- Ilkcaracan, I. and Zuazu, I. (2025). How gender and work status shape political ideology: Evidence from homemakers in Spain. *Feminist Economics*, forthcoming.
- Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2000). The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women's and men's voting behavior in global perspective. *International Political Science Review*, 21(4):441–463.
- Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2003). *Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world*. Cambridge University Press.

- Juhn, C., Ujhelyi, G., and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2013). Trade liberalization and gender inequality. *American Economic Review*, 103(3):269–273.
- Juhn, C., Ujhelyi, G., and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2014). Men, women, and machines: How trade impacts gender inequality. *Journal of Development Economics*, 106:179–193.
- Kurer, T. (2020). The declining middle: Occupational change, social status, and the populist right. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(10-11):1798–1835.
- Kuznets, S. (1966). *Modern economic growth: Rate, structure, and spread*, volume 2. Yale University Press New Haven.
- Lewis, W. A. (1965). A review of economic development. *The American Economic Review*, 55(1/2):1–16.
- McMillan, M., Rodrik, D., and Sepulveda, C. (2017). Structural change, fundamentals, and growth: A framework and case studies. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, (8041).

- Mensah, E., Owusu, S., Foster-McGregor, N., and Szirmai, A. (2023). Structural change, productivity growth and labour market turbulence in sub-saharan africa. *Journal of African Economies*, 32(3):175–208.
- Ocampo, J. A. (2020). Industrial policy, macroeconomics, and structural change.
- Rendall, M. (2013). Structural change in developing countries: has it decreased gender inequality? *World Development*, 45:1–16.
- Rodrik, D. (2016). Premature deindustrialization. *Journal of economic growth*, 21(1):1–33.
- Savona, M. and Vertova, G. (2025). Structural change, innovation and gender gaps. *Review of Political Economy*, pages 1–23.
- Seguino, S. and Braunstein, E. (2019). The costs of exclusion: Gender job segregation, structural change and the labour share of income. *Development and Change*, 50(4):976–1008.
- Shorrocks, R. (2018). Cohort change in political gender gaps in europe and canada: the role of modernization. *Politics & Society*, 46(2):135–175.

- Spierings, N. (2014). The influence of patriarchal norms, institutions, and household composition on women's employment in twenty-eight muslim-majority countries. *Feminist Economics*, 20(4):87–112.
- Tejani, S. and Kucera, D. (2021). Defeminization, structural transformation and technological upgrading in manufacturing. *Development and Change*, 52(3):533–573.
- Tregenna, F. (2015). Deindustrialisation: an issue for both developed and developing countries. In *Routledge handbook of industry and development*, pages 111–129. Routledge.
- Union, E. (20254). Artificial intelligence and the future of work. *European Union*, (KE-01-24-019-EN-N):ISBN 978–92–68–21816–7.
- Welch, F. (2000). Growth in women's relative wages and in inequality among men: One phenomenon or two? *American Economic Review*, 90(2):444–449.